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Capitalism, Anti-Capitalism and the Battle of Ideas  
In the future, the historian of ideas will have a hard time in assessing the period in 
which we live. It has been only a couple of decades since the ‘end of history’ was 
declared: that is, the triumph of liberal democracy, signalled by the fall of its opponent, 
state socialism in the Eastern bloc in 1989–91. Supposedly, we are living in the times of 
TINA (There Is No Alternative) and the ‘neo-liberal’ consensus, though never defined, 
casts a heavy shadow. Yet, a reality test some years after the financial crisis of 2008 
shows that these assumptions, while popular (especially in academia and in leftist 
circles), are neither self-evident nor necessarily correct.  
Therein lies an intellectual mystery: to a significant extent, the left has managed to 
popularize a narrative on the supposed causes of the crisis, while at the same time it has 
a hard time bringing about any positive change in the sphere of politics. An interesting 
fact is that the steady vic- torious advance of the left in the realm of ideas is hardly ever 
recognized. Yet someone trying to think of the most popular explanation for the social 
and economic problems of our times, would find that—from the President of the USA 
Barack Obama to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and from Pope Francis to several Nobel 
Prize laureates—the answer was almost unanimous: what brought us here was the free-
market sys- tem and greedy bankers, running amok after deregulation and taking 
advantage of a retreat in state control. Few pause to think that this nar- rative, while 
appealing to large numbers of people across political divi- sions, is problematic. After 
all, the banking sector has been one of the most strictly regulated fields of the US (and 
the European) economy, supervised by more than 115 regulatory agencies (Yadav 
2010, p. 323). Also, it is fairly doubtful that the de-regulation that actually took place in 
the last decades in the banking sector had anything to do with the 2008 crash (Calabria 
2009; Gramm 2009). Strong evidence for the roots of the crisis that go against the 
narrative of the left, such as the politi- cally motivated encouragement of subprime 
mortgages by consecutive US governments, practically forcing banks to provide loans 
with ques- tionable security to poorer families, and with the mortgages secured by the 
quasi-governmental enterprises of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are hardly mentioned 
in mainstream debates on what went wrong in the period leading to 2008. The success 
of the leftist narrative in explaining the 2008 meltdown is also evident in the attention 
that the 2011 Occupy movement has attracted from the media, despite its relatively 
small size. It is also telling that Occupy’s message was addressed with sympathy, even 
among the establishment, including unlikely figures such as the 2012 Republican 
Candidate Mitt Romney (Geiger and Reston 2011), the US Federal Reserve’s Chairman 
Ben Bernanke (Coscarelli 2011) and the UK Business Secretary Vince Cable (the 
Guardian 2011).  
But the success of the leftist ideology in the public sphere goes beyond outlining a 
convincing narrative for the 2008 crisis. Issues such as envi- ronmentalism and the 
construction of income inequality as a social problem, which used to be predominantly 
on the agenda of the left, are now almost unanimously adopted by the political 
establishment. In July 2015, Pope Francis issued the ‘Encyclical Laudato Si’ on the Care 
of our Common Home’, a document that could be read as a manifesto for sus- tainable 
development and global justice, effectively condemning some of the core elements of 
capitalism, such as individualism and consumerism (Holy Father Francis 2015). The US 
President Obama has named climate  
change as the biggest challenge humanity is facing and income inequal- ity the biggest 
domestic challenge for the US economy (Harwood 2015; Park 2015). The UK’s 
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, in his first months after assuming 
leadership of the Tories, and perhaps in an attempt to distance himself from the 
Thatcherite image of rigid material- ism and individualism, declared that ‘it’s time we 
admitted that there’s more to life than money and it’s time we focused not just on GDP 
but on GWB—general wellbeing’ (BBC 2006a). He also characterized con- sumer culture 
as problematic, for failing to ‘meet the deep human need for commitment and 
belonging’ (BBC 2006a). The Conservative Party even changed its logo to a tree, with 
Cameron launching the slogan ‘vote blue, go green’, and not hesitating to use a motto of 
the Global Justice Movement, calling people to ‘think global, act local’ (BBC 2006b). 
Granted, these are more elements of political posturing than policy, but the mere fact 
that for PR reasons he had to adopt this image is quite tell- ing about what the 
ideological zeitgeist of our times demands.  
Furedi is right to mention that, despite a wave of support for the ideol- ogy of free-
market liberalism (or so-called ‘neo-liberalism’) in the 1980s, and despite the fact that 
the market economy seems to be the only viable game in town today, capitalism has lost 
the battle of ideas (Furedi 2013). There might be a growing movement of radicals for 
capitalism, as evi- denced by the lively Ron Paul presidential campaigns in 2008 and 
2012, a surge in sales of Ayn Rand books and rapid growth of the Students for Liberty 
movement, but the fact remains that such voices are still consid- ered marginal 
outsiders. But then, if capitalism is (falsely or correctly) blamed for the 2008 financial 
crisis and the slow and timid recovery in subsequent years, then why is the left not 
grasping the chance to fill the void, ride the tide and dominate politically? Why is it that, 
when it manages to gain power, as in the case of the Coalition of the Radical Left 
(Syriza) in Greece, it, ironically, confirms that indeed there is no alterna- tive and has to 
capitulate to the continuation of so-called austerity pro- grammes? And if the left has 
succeeded in seeing some of its ideas, or at least its rhetoric, accepted by the powers 
that be, and if it has throughout recent decades de-legitimized some of the fundamental 
principles of free- market capitalism (individualism, rigid economic growth, 
materialism) among considerable sections of the population, but then fails to provide a 
better alternative, does it have any practical political significance, beyond being ‘a voice 
of conscience’ or ‘the Party of complaint’? These are the questions that were the initial 
inspiration for writing the current book.  
The Left Then and Now  
In order to solve an intellectual mystery, its nature first needs to be prop- erly 
understood. If one wishes to understand the conundrum of the apparent popularity of 
leftist ideas in the cultural sphere today with the concurrent inability of the political left 
to pose a viable alternative to capitalism (or, more properly, to the mixed economy that 
is dominant today), what needs to be clarified is: (a) what are the ideas that character- 
ize the left today, (b) where do they come from, (c) why are they more mainstream now 
and (d) why can’t they materialize in a successful politi- cal, social and economic 
programme?  
This book is about the changes in the philosophical orientation, the values and the 
ethics of the left in recent decades. Such changes have been apparent since the 1960s 
and that is why the term ‘New Left’ has been used: so as to distinguish the ideas, forms 
of action and cultural values of some new political and social movements from those of 
the so-called ‘old-left’, that is, the labour and socialist movements and the strong 
communist parties of the past that focused their struggle on class interests and were 
oriented mostly towards conquering political power and transforming society as a 
whole, based on their ideology. In this work the term ‘New Left’ refers to the relevant 
movements and ideas of the 1960s and 1970s, while the term ‘new left’ (lower case) 
will be used to refer to the broader set of movements which share common ideologi- cal 
roots with the New Left but have developed in different directions. Yet, the old left is in 
such decline (with exceptions that only prove the rule, such as the ‘orthodox’ 
Communist Party of Greece), that some- times the terms ‘left’ and ‘new left’ might be 
used interchangeably.  
I intend to focus in two topics that appeared with the New Left and that I consider 
crucial for shaping the character of the wider left in the upcoming decades: (a) a 
questioning of ‘materialist’ values, leading to a problematization of economic growth 
and (b) an uneasiness with ‘instru-  
mental reason’ as a tool for understanding (and changing) the world and the promotion, 
in its place, of an appeal to emotionalism. These themes are key if one wants to 
understand the intellectual journey of the left in the last few decades: from the adoption 
of environmentalism as one of its more central narratives to the fellow-travelling with 
the so-called post-modernist school and other related philosophical/epistemological 
movements, to the switch from the anti-authoritarian ‘it is forbidden to forbid’ of the 
1960s to a ‘cosying up’ with the welfare state and the constant calls for more 
intervention and regulation (from speech codes to calls for higher taxes) in the past few 
decades. Additionally, a third topic in the background, coming to existence as a result of 
the two main topics, will be the construction of a weak human subjectivity by the New 
Left and its heirs, often undermining individual agency and seeing a vulner- able human 
subject as being under constant threat from environmental, physical and emotional 
forces.  
The themes underlying the examination of these topics are the follow- ing: (a) these 
changes in the left in recent decades will be seen from a crit- ical perspective and a 
hypothesis will be that they might have something to do with the left’s inability to form 
a persuadive and successful political and economic model, (b) these changes are in a 
dialectical relationship with the zeitgeist and the popular philosophical trends of each 
era; they bear the marks of dominant contemporary ideas and at the same time they 
influence and shape these ideas.  
If one had to fit on a single page an overview of the historical jour- ney of the left, the 
starting point would have to be the ideas of the Enlightenment and of modernity, as 
expressed by figures such as Francis Bacon, John Locke and René Descartes. These were 
the beginning of the road that led to the rise to socialism and liberalism, two forces 
fighting for the overthrow of the old order of religious mysticism, political oppression 
and social and economic backwardness. But what does it mean to speak about 
modernity? What are the characteristics of an era, a set of values and a philosophical 
outlook that can bear the title ‘modern’? Hicks gives a good account of the meaning of 
the modern: (a) an outlook having as a starting point the natural, as opposed to the pre-
modern attachment to the supernatural, (b) reason and perception as the means 
through which the world can be known, as opposed to faith and mysticism, (c) moral 
autonomy in making one’s character, as opposed to ideas of pre-given order or original 
sin, (d) the individual as the unit of value, not to be sub- ordinated to a higher tribal or 
feudal authority (Hicks 2004, pp. 7–8). It logically follows that if humans are capable of 
reason and of perceiving reality, and at the same time they are ends in themselves, 
rather than being born to serve the needs of a master or group, then they can be trusted 
with political and economic freedom, and this freedom will lead to a future that will be 
better and more prosperous.  
Bauman’s poetic narration of the first steps of the communist ideal (irrespective of 
whether communism ever actually had anything to do with this image) as a 
materialization of modernity in all its glory is telling and worth of a lengthy quotation:  
Communism was made to the measure of modern hopes and promises. Socialism’s younger, 
hotheaded and impatient brother, it wholeheartedly shared in the family trust in the wonderful 
promises and prospects of modernity, and was awe-struck by the breathtaking vistas of society 
doing away with historical and natural necessity and by the idea of the ultimate subordination 
of nature to human needs and desires. [...] Its war cry was: ‘Kingdom of Reason—now!’ Like 
socialism (and all other staunch believers in the modern values of technological progress, the 
transformation of nature and a society of plenty), communism was thoroughly modern in its 
conviction that a good society can only be a carefully designed, rationally managed and 
thoroughly industrialized society. [...] Communism was modernity in its most determined mood 
and most decisive posture; moder- nity streamlined, purified of the last shred of the chaotic, the 
irrational, the spontaneous, the unpredictable. (1992, pp. 166–7)  
Thus, socialism (sometimes used interchangeably with communism by its early 
advocates) had one raison d’être: to provide even more than capitalism, minus the 
latter’s perceived injustices. This spirit is captured by the radical suffragette Sylvia 
Pankhurst, who in (1923) stated what socialism stands for:  
Socialism means plenty for all. We do not preach a gospel of want and scarcity, but of 
abundance. Our desire is not to make poor those who today are rich, in order to put the poor in 
the place where the rich are now. Our  
desire is not to pull down the present rulers to put other rulers in their place. We wish to 
abolish poverty and to provide abundance for all. We do not call for limitation of births, for 
penurious thrift, and self-denial. We call for a great production that will supply all, and more 
than all the people can consume.  
Or take the example of Trotsky, who, in 1936, in The Revolution Betrayed, criticizes the 
USSR state-controlled economy for not achieving the abundance of the USA: ‘How many 
years are needed in order to make it possible for every Soviet citizen to use an 
automobile in any direction he chooses, refilling his gas tank without difficulty en route? 
In barbarian society the rider and the pedestrian constituted two classes. The automo- 
bile differentiates society no less than the saddle horse’ (2013, loc. 595).  
Thus, socialism and communism (at least as envisioned by Karl Marx and his early 
proponents), was built on three foundations: reason and scientific method, human 
agency and materialism. Humans were per- ceived as being at the centre of history and 
as capable of changing its course; God, fate or nature cannot dictate where history will 
go; it is only man who is in the driving seat, though limited by specific histori- cal 
conditions. For liberalism ‘man’ is the individual and for Marx ‘man’ could be a social 
class pursuing its interests, but the essence remains: we, as humanity, retain endless 
possibilities for a better world of plenty. This is why, for Marx, capitalism was the most 
revolutionary system up to that historical point: the productive forces it unleashed 
could promise material abundance and total domination over nature. As opposed to the 
romantic anti-capitalists of the nineteenth century, who were terri- fied by the 
processes of industrialization, urbanization and of the instru- mental use of nature, 
Marx’s scientific socialism realized that these very procedures were essential for the 
realization of freedom as an escape from need and from scarcity. This Promethean view 
of man was captured in its purest form by the Soviet writer Maxim Gorky, who, dazzled 
by the posi- tive vision that the Russian Revolution provided (at least in the minds of its 
advocates), declared that ‘once the class struggle has been won, Soviet humankind will 
be free to engage its final enemy: nature’ (cited in Westermann and Garrett 2011, p. 87). 
Here, the meaning of nature goes beyond the trees or the Russian winter; nature 
symbolizes limits and the victory over nature would mean victory over whatever is 
holding back human prosperity, the aim being a continuous progress towards overcom- 
ing finite human nature itself.  
An interesting thought experiment would be to look at how ideas popular among leftist 
circles in recent decades would be perceived by Trotsky, Pankhurst, Gorky or their 
comrades; ideas such as sustainabil- ity, or ‘prosperity without growth’ (Jackson 2011), 
or ‘small is beautiful’ (Schumacher 1993), or the pathologization of consumerism as a 
mental health threat in the form of ‘affluenza’ (James 2007), or the supposed threat to 
our planet’s carrying capacity because of too many people living longer. Or, how would 
Marx himself—who celebrated in his Communist Manifesto the globalization brought 
about by the market and how ‘to the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from 
under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood’ (Marx, K. & Engels, F. 
1848)—react to the rise of the ‘anti-globalization movement’ and the popularity it 
enjoyed among leftist circles in the years around the turn of the twenty-first century. 
Granted, the effects of rapid economic growth on nature were, up to a point, unknown 
during the period in which the pioneers of scientific socialism lived and wrote. Yet it 
seems evident from their philosophy that their faith in human reason and scientific 
method to come up with solutions to pressing problems would have them adopt- ing a 
more positive view, championing even better technologies and even more economic 
development to face challenges such as climate change, rather than viewing them as an 
existential threat, calling for a re-evalua- tion of the values of modernity.  
Where This Book Comes from and Where It Goes  
The fact that the new left is different from the old left, that it has adopted causes such as 
environmentalism and has been influenced by schools of thought that question 
‘modernity’s’ tradition of rationality, is no big news. Numerous scholars from various 
schools of thought have dealt with the changing nature of the left and of radical politics 
in general. Bookchin  
(1995) spotted an ‘unbridgeable chasm’ between the ‘lifestyle anarchism’ of the 1970s 
and 1980s and the more focused and political movements of the 1960s. Lasch (1991) 
described the transition of the 1960s radicals to a defeatist and introspective ‘culture of 
narcissism’ and how this shift mirrored the dominant culture in USA at that time. 
Bauman (1992) described the transition to ‘post-modernity’ as a moving away from the 
ideals of faith in progress, reason and science. A similar line of thought has been shared 
by a number of scholars on the left, including, among others, Callinicos (1989) and 
Jameson (1990). Žižek (2002, 2009) and Furedi (1992, 2005) have also criticized the 
change in the nature and character of the left. Some useful insights could be drawn also 
from foes of the left. A more philosophical criticism of the new left from a pro- capitalist 
point of view came from Ayn Rand (1999), whereas some inter- esting insights were 
also offered by an occasional fellow-traveller of the New Left, the libertarian thinker 
Murray Rothbard (1961, 1965, 1970).  
My research, though based on the criticisms of the various aforemen- tioned scholars, 
will go further than their work: I am not merely reflecting on changes in the philosophy, 
values and ideas of the contemporary left; I also trace the genealogy of these changes. 
Where did they come from, when did they gain prominence and in what environments 
did they find fertile ground? I am also challenging part of the political theory and bib- 
liography of social movements studies, which views the 1960s as a period when radical 
theory and action reached a peak, followed by a decline and a de-politicization in 
subsequent decades. As will become evident, factors that have been blamed for the 
decline of the political left in the ‘counter- revolution’ of the 1970s and 1980s, were 
already present in the ‘golden era’ of the 1960s. Most importantly, I claim that the 
moving away of the left from some of the core principles of ‘modernity’s’ tradition—
such as ratio- nality, faith in human agency as bearer of change and a trust in continu- 
ous economic growth bringing more and more affluence to more and more people—can 
help us understand some of the recent misfortunes of the left, such as the rapid 
disappearance of the Occupy Movement or the inability of Syriza in Greece to meet 
expectations and introduce an alternative economic model to ‘austerity’.  
A term that needs clarification and that plays a central role in my analysis is ‘lifestyle 
activism’. Why do I not just refer to the ‘new left’, but instead introduce another term? 
The notion of ‘lifestyle activism’ has its roots in the work of left-libertarian scholar 
Murray Bookchin—the inspiration for my PhD thesis that is the basis of this book. A 
couple of decades ago, Bookchin identified some trends in radical movements that he 
considered new and problematic. Under the umbrella-term of ‘life- style anarchism’, 
Bookchin anathematized what he considered as degrad- ing trends developing since the 
1970s, mainly in the anarchist milieu, but also in social movements in general 
(Bookchin 1995). These trends included:  
• –  a drift away from reason towards subjectivism, relativism and emo- tionalism 
(fused with spiritualism and what he characterized as a New Age-inspired 
enchantment with the self)  
• –  a drift away from serious organizational political commitment  
• –  an emphasis on episodic ‘happenings’ and protest events, rather  
than on a coherent programme  
• –  a priority of means over ends, where ‘the movement is the  
message’.  
• –  For Bookchin, lifestyle anarchism and the tradition of social anar-  
chism were separate by ‘an unbridgeable chasm’. He identified three main 
characteristics in social anarchism that are absent from the newly arisen trend:  
• –  an organizational base  
• –  a theoretical coherence, resulting from a rational analysis  
• –  a universalist political vision.  
The elements Bookchin attributes to social anarchism could also be used to 
describe the old left, whereas some of the characteristics of ‘lifestyle anarchism’ 
seem to mirror parts of today’s left. However, despite Bookchin’s insightful 
contribution, I consider his notion of ‘lifestyle anarchism’ as quite narrow and 
inadequate to analyse the trends that I wish to examine in this book. To begin 
with, Bookchin was mostly referring to the anarchist milieu, of which he was a 
part. Yet some of the tendencies he described have moved beyond the anarchist 
movement to wider parts of the left and of social move- ments. Also, although 
Bookchin’s analysis was important and pio- neering, his allegiance to ecology 
and his rigid anti-capitalism limited the extent to which materialism and a 
problematization of  
economic growth were part of his criticism’s frame. As anti-materi- alist values are 
important in my thesis, I had to go beyond Bookchin’s analysis. Thus I needed a term 
that would describe an ‘unbridgeable gap’ between the new left and the old left, as 
Bookchin did, but with a wider emphasis. Since this term had to signify some sort of 
intellectual allegiance to Bookchin’s work and signify that the focus of my case studies 
will be mostly protest movements, I chose the term ‘lifestyle activism’.  
Thus, by now the structure and scope of this book should have become clearer. Initially, 
a more theoretical and philosophical gen- eral overview of how the new left has been 
different from the old left will be attempted. This will inevitably be wide in its scope. 
Later, this wide scope will be put to the test in specific cases of social and political 
movements, so as to see whether these changes in the phi- losophy of the left that were 
identified in the opening parts of the book are actually mirrored on the ground. What I 
will be searching for in my case studies is a set of ideas, values, cultural codes and forms 
of action that I have called ‘lifestyle activism’ and that incor- porate the ideological 
changes in the character of the left. At the same time, two underlying questions will be 
gradually addressed: how do these changes in the character of the left mirror changes in 
the dominant ideology and the leitmotifs of our times and do the ideas associated with 
‘lifestyle activism’ play any role in the ‘only limited political success of the left’?  
One criticism that such a work might attract has to do with the wideness of its scope. 
One might say that drawing conclusions and attributing characteristics to something as 
broad as ‘the left’, which could stretch from parts of the Democratic Party of the USA to 
radical anarchists in Greece, and from British trade unionists to the Podemos party in 
Spain, is bad scholarship, especially since the case studies focus on several grassroots 
movements that do not necessar- ily represent such a large non-homogeneous political 
milieu. There are two answers to this objection. In each era, the ideas that domi- nate on 
the political level and on the ideological spectrum, have some common background and 
some references in the so-called Leitkultur of that society. These ideas become so 
dominant that they tend to be perceived and accepted automatically, with little ques- 
tioning. An example of a Leitkultur becoming prevalent and having a huge influence on 
the biggest part of the political spectrum was the anti-liberalism of the period around 
the Second World War, where from fascism to the New Deal and from Stalinism to 
conser- vatism, the idea was shared that a laissez-faire approach to economic and social 
life is problematic and thus the state should play a central role. My point is that if ideas 
such as anti-materialism, environmen- talism, post-modernism and the critique of 
instrumental reason have indeed become influential at the cultural level, then one 
would expect them to be influential among ‘the left’ as well, even if the latter is not 
easily defined as an homogeneous bloc.  
In addition, the fact that I have examined a period of almost five decades and a variety 
of different campaigns to explore and illus- trate the arguments of this book will 
hopefully prove that my theory has been tested in depth. The case studies I have chosen 
as examples illustrating my arguments are quite diverse in political, geographical and 
temporal terms. In the 1960s, I will take the case study of stu- dent radicalism and the 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) organization in the USA. The ideas of the New 
Left and the scholars behind them had a greater influence in the USA than in, say, 
France, where 1960s radicalism was more of a fusion of New Left ideals with the old left 
(partly due to explained by the prominent role of various Maoist and Trotskyist groups, 
but also that of the Communist Party). Thus, if the ideas and the counter-cultural values 
that formed the New Left as a phenomenon play a key role in understanding subsequent 
developments (post 1960s) in the left, then the SDS is a useful case study. Chapter 3 will 
deal with the supposed de-radi- calization of the 1970s and 1980s. I consider the fusion 
of leftist ideas with the environmental movement as a key moment in grasp- ing the 
change in the DNA and core philosophical premises of the wider left. Thus, the case of 
the German Greens, materializing the fusion of the ideas of the New Left and of counter-
culture with the rising environmentalist concerns, can shed light on the ideological 
processes of the time. I will also examine the phenomenon of the protest camps of that 
period, as a materialization of the influence of  
lifestyle activism. Then, in the late 1990s and early 2000s some of the core narratives of 
the New Left were mobilized and acquired an international scope against the process of 
globalization. The anti- globalization movement is an important case study, not only 
because of its scope and size but also because of the legacy it left and how it influenced 
later movements. Finally, the case study from the wave of contention that followed the 
financial crisis of 2008 will be the Occupy the London Stock Exchange protest, as it is a 
movement that I have studied in depth through ethnographic research for my PhD. Yet 
reference will also be made to the re-emergence of the political left, with Syriza in 
Greece being the best example, and whether it signifies a retreat from the limitations of 
lifestyle activ- ism. The case studies will only solidify my more general arguments, 
which are based not only on these movements but also on the wider political ideas and 
mobilizations of each period.  
Another potential misunderstanding of this book is that it repre- sents a nostalgic 
longing for a return to the good old left or to a twentieth- (or nineteenth-) century 
socialist ideal. Nothing could be further from the truth. The old left, as expressed 
through the Marxist-Leninist communist movements of the previous century, was, 
beyond any reasonable doubt, a political, economic and moral failure (and the term 
‘failure’ might be a huge understatement). Also, the old left’s social-democratic 
Keynesian expression gradually came to feel dated as the market became more 
globalized, capital achieved more mobility and technology revolutionized human rela- 
tions more and more extensively. This partially explains why the heirs of the social-
democratic wing of the old left have for some decades now tried to distance themselves 
from their political prede- cessors (New Labour being an obvious example of that 
tendency). What is the point, then, in setting the old left as a point of refer- ence? To 
begin with, the old left had a philosophical starting point that, as shown earlier, was 
linked to the spirit of the Enlightenment, of the Industrial Revolution and of modernity. 
It will be shown that this is not the case with the New Left; therefore, the old left can 
operate as a yardstick to measure the extent to which the New Left has moved away 
from the roots of radical movements of the past.  
In addition, the old left goes beyond Stalinism and the state- bureaucratic complex of 
social democracy: there is a rich tradition on the left of freedom, humanism, liberalism 
and individual agency, from workers’ mutual aid communities to the libertarian free 
school of the Escuela Moderna in Spain, and from aspects of the work of Marx himself, 
such as his fierce criticism of the state apparatus in The Civil War in France (1871) to 
the autonomist tradition that ele- ments of the New Left reinvented in the 1960s. The 
book claims that this tradition is the one from which the New Left is mostly deviating, 
and it is only this tradition that could revitalize the left.  
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